Cooperation has always been recognised as a fundamental ingredient in the creation of societies and the generation of wealth. As a concept, it has been studied for many years. Yet, in practice, its emergence and persistence are less understood. In the following a game theoretic approach to the study of cooperation based on the Prisoners' Dilemma is reviewed. Using a Genetic Algorithm, strategies for playing the In nitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma are evolved. Are also reported results obtained with an implementation in MATLAB of such an algorithm and the insights it provides with regard emergence and persistence of cooperative behaviour.
Introduction
Game theory has been used in economics ever since its inception in 1944 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in a book with the title, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. It is expanding at a prodigious rate: Already well established in other social sciences it has now gained a strong foothold in political sciences and biology. Another book with much in uence on the success of game theory is Games and Decisions by Luce and Rai a, 14] .
A lot of game theory models are mathematically understood and universally accepted results can be found in most Operational Research texbooks. A case in mind is the class of zero-sum games or strictly competitive games. Hide-and-Seek is a good example: The discovered has lost and the discoverer has won. At the other extreme are the so called strictly cooperative or pure coordination games where the players' interests are exactly the same. The game of Rendez-vous is a good example in which opponents released in a crowded city try to nd each other. These games are declared by some to be trivial at least from the theoretical point of view. In 14] , for instance, it is asserted that`any group of decision makers which can be thought of as having a unitary interest motivating its decisions can be treated as an individual in the theory' of games. Note that empirical investigations do not support this statement and that decision making in pure coordination situations is far from trivial, 5].
Real world problems, however, are seldom strictly of either of these types. They are often a mixture of both, i.e. the players' interests are neither diametrically opposed nor in total agreement. These games are known as Cooperation/Collusion or Cooperative/Competitive games. They usually present opportunity for cooperation stemming from the existence of common objectives, i.e. what is good for a player may also be good for the other(s).
This game model ts well a lot of retail market situations which are not classic monopolies. Consider the Electricity retail market in England and Wales, for instance. Two main players (a Duopoly) namely National Power and PowerGen are involved beside a dozen other players with a markedly smaller share of the market. The main players have opposed objectives such as increase/maintain their respective shares of the market, but also common grounds such as the requirement of government to maintain diversity in the market place. It is obviously not a zero-sum game. It is more realistically modelled as a Cooperative/Competitive game. As such, it is well represented by the so called Prisoners' Dilemma paradigm. In the following, this game will be reviewed and a computational approach to the study of cooperation based on genetic algorithms will be presented.
The Prisoners' Dilemma
The Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) is a samll game popular as a paradigm for the problem of human cooperation. It is said to have been brought to attention by Merrill Flood of the Rand Corporation in 1951 and was later formulated by Al Tucker 5, 4] . This formulation can be as follows :  Player2  C  D  Player1 C R=3,R=3 S=0,T=5  D T=5,S=0 P=1,P=1  Table 1 : Formulation of PD: The Payo Matrix
In the payo matrix of Table 1 , actions are C and D standing for 'Cooperate' and 'Defect' respectively. Traditionally, the payo s are represented by R, P, T, and S standing respectively for 'Reward', 'Punishment', 'Temptation', and 'Sucker's' payo . This payo matrix shows that defecting is bene cial to both players for two reasons: First, it leads to a greater payo (T = 5) in case the other player cooperates, (S = 0). Second it is a safe move because neither knows what the other's move will be. So, to rational players defecting is the best choice. But, if both players choose to defect then it leads to a worse payo (P = 1) as compared to cooperating (R = 3). That is the dilemma.
For many 7, 8, 15] this problem captures so well cooperation in real life that not understanding how it may be achieved in this simple situation is a good reason to give up thinking about rational cooperation altogether. Others, however, argue that the special setting of the one shot PD is contrary to the idea of cooperation. First, because the only equilibrium point is the outcome P,P] which is a Nash equilibrium. Recall that a Nash equilibrium arises when the strategy choice of each player is the best reply to the strategy choices of the other players 3]. Second, P,P] is at the intersection of minimax strategy choices for both players. These minimax strategies are dominant for both players, hence the exclusion in principal of cooperation (by virtue of the dominance of the chosen strategies). Morover, even if cooperative strategies were chosen, the resulting cooperative`solution' is not an equilibrium point. This means that it is not stable due to the fact that both players are tempted to defect from it. It should also be noted that cooperative problems in real life are likely to be faced repeatedly. Which makes the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (IPD) a more appropriate model for the study of cooperation than the one-shot version of the game. Note, also that the orthodox view among game theorists is that cooperation cannot result from rational play in the one shot PD, 4].
In 5], it is further pointed out that the usual interpretation of the C choice as Cooperative and the D choice as Competitive should be questioned. This is because cooperation in this instance carries an element of risk, and the rational players can only be cooperative in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Also, defectiveness is triggered by suspicious defensiveness and the relative safety of the D choice as opposed to competitiveness 5]. This observation makes the empirical investigation of cooperation a more attractive approach than its analytical counterpart.
The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma
This version of the game is the subject of interest here. The game proceeds over a number of moves the value of which is either decided before hand in which case results are those of the one-shot PD diluted, or the game is inde nitely repeated until some random event occurs and brings it to a permanent end. This is modelled by using a xed probability that the event will occur after each round of PD's. The inde nite aspect of the game is captured by concentrating on small 's.
The PD game is characterised by the strict inequality relations between the payo s: T > R > P > S. And to avoid coordination or total agreement getting a`helping hand', most experimental PD games have a payo matrix satisfying: 2R > S + T , as in Table 1 .
In the iterated PD (IPD), the concept of time, contrary to the one-shot PD, takes all its weight: players, for instance, realise that reprisals as well as reward may be triggered by their strategy choices. And because of this time dimension the IPD presents the players with scope for investigating each others behaviour. There is opportunity for cooperative, deceptive, threatening, exploitatative behaviours and much more. But there is no guarantee that any one behaviour will take place. This opportunity for diverse behaviours to crop up in the IPD maps to a similarly large set of diverse strategies to choose from, 1, 2, 13]. Some of these strategies will be discussed later.
The close analysis of the IPD reveals that, unlike the one-shot PD, it has a large number of Nash equilibria. These being inside the convex hull of the outcomes (0,5), (3, 3) , (5,0), (1,1) of the pure strategies in the one-shot PD, (see Figure 1 ). Note that (1,1) corresponding to P,P] is a Nash equilibrium for the IPD also. 
Cooperation in the IPD: Emergence and Persistence
The question, the answer to which is of interest to anyone who attempted to use IPD as a model for capturing cooperative behaviour, is how does Cooperation arise in the IPD, in the rst place? When it has arisen how is it sustained?
In their ground breaking work of 1957, 14], Luce and Rai a predicted that in the IPD, sequences of R,R] outcomes will arise as the players are aware of the e ect of reprisals. It is the fear of reprisal which is the trigger of the cooperative behaviour.
However, early experimental results pointed to the contrary: the players somehow get frequently entangled in point 1,1] of Figure 1 , corresponding to the outcome P,P]. This was the DD lock-in e ect observed in many experimental studies of the late 50's and early 60's, 6], 5].
More recent results are not any clearer: In 11] for instance it is argued that cooperation emerges invariably in the IPD due to an implicit communication between the players; players cannot communicate explicitely, but they do so by playing cooperatives moves, thus signalling their`good intentions'. For instance, if a player persists in choosing C whatever the strategy choice of his opponent, then it can be seen as a signal for cooperative play which is going to be reciprocated, according to 11]. This is rather naive although it should be an acceptable explanation to some particular experimental results. The objection, of course, is that overdoing cooperative play can also be seen as a sign of weakness or foolishness that prompts exploitation and punishment. Hence, the emergence of the opposite of the desired e ect.
A Simple Explanation?
The seemingly contradictory results so far reviewed may be seen perfectly reasonable if we accept that at start of play in most experiments, players have no clear overriding objectives. They, therefore try to explore the di erent strategies open to them and upon reward or reprisal fall into a sequence of P,P]'s or R,R]'s from which it is dicult to get out, these outcomes being Nash equilibrium points. It is the inventiveness of the players, and their overriding objectives becoming clearer after some rounds of play, which help break the sequence. These overriding objectives have been summed up in 16] as follows: maximising joint payo s, leading to the C choice; maximising individual payo s, with no clear strategy; maximising relative payo s, i.e. attempting to beat the opponent and that points to the D choice. This analysis ts well the results reported in 18]. There, it is said that in the IPD, at the beginning players tend to choose C in a proportion slightly greater that 1/2. This phase is then followed by a rapid decline in cooperation (a "sobering period"). After approximately 30 repetitions, the C choice becomes more frequent reaching around 60% in 300 repetitions.
The Evolutionary Approach
The work that has undoubtedly marked recent interests in the IPD is that of Robert Axelrod, 1, 2] where computer tournaments were used in the study of the evolution of cooperation. The study acted as a stimulus for the design of complex strategies and the investigation of simple ones. It points however to cooperative strategies winning over competitive ones in the long run. It falls short of explaining how Cooperation emerges in the rst place, but it gives a sound explanation for its persistence: Once it has emerged it tends to be sustained by the building blocks or genes of cooperative strategies becoming the majority in the pool of surviving genes. In other words evolution favours cooperative strategies.
Results that con rm the persistence of cooperative strategies in the IPD have also been reported in 12]. There, the idea of evolution is applied to a spatial model in which IPD is played within neighborhoods and that evolution works on a local level. Strategies are represented as small automata, identical for a player but possibly in di erent states against di erent neighbours. Simulation results show that cooperative strategies have a high rate of survival and that they persist even in stochastic environments.
Yet, other extensive simulation results, in the line of Axelrod's work, reported in 13] and 17], are less conclusive. In 4] also, the whole interpretation of tournament results is criticised. It is further argued that there are a lot of arbitrary factors such as the length of the chromosomes, the strategies against which others are evolved, the length of games etc... which prevent from accepting generalisations of the results on cooperative behaviour. This is a fair criticism, but so far, this evolutionary approach is the most promising. A good review of this approach and further experiments and discussions can be found in a succession of articles by D.R.Hofstadter collected in his Metamagical Themas, 9].
Strategies and Automaton Representation
In IPD and other games strategies are of two types: pure and mixed.`A pure strategy for a player in a game is a complete description of what the player plans to do whenever he or she might be called upon to make a decision. A mixed strategy arises when a player randomizes over his pure strategies, perhaps by tossing a coin or rolling a dice', (Binmore, 1994) , 4].
In the one shot PD, there are two pure strategies, Defect and Cooperate. In the IPD, their number is in nite and so is the number of mixed strategies.
Representation
Finite state machine or Moore machine representation of strategies is common in game theory. A Moore machine consists of states ( nite number of them represented as circles with a label inside) and transitional arcs (directed arcs) for moving from one state to another. Arcs are labelled and only the arc which starts o the automaton has no label; it takes that of the state to which it leads initially.
In the present context the player who adopts a strategy described by a nite state machine, falls initially into a state following the unlabelled arc. From then on its state depends on the move of the opponent, i.e. the labelled arcs emanating from the current state. If the opponent follows an arc which leads to the same current state, then the player remains in the same state. If the opponent follows an arc leading to another state, then our player changes state accordingly.
A strategy that is well studied and seems to be the overall winner in Axelrod's Olympiad 1, 2] is TIT-FOR-TAT. This strategy is based on reciprocity but it starts with a C move. A nite automaton representation of it is in Figure 2 . If both players adopt TIT-FOR-TAT then R,R] will always be the outcome. TAT-FOR-TIT on the other hand is a variation on TIT-FOR-TAT. It is also based on reciprocity but starts play with the D choice. Its representation as a nite automaton is in Figure 3 .
TIT-FOR-TAT is considered as a`nice' strategy while TAT-FOR-TIT is`nasty'. The reason for that is the latter starts by getting into a D state. As long as the reply is C, it remains in that state. If, however, the reply is a D (a retaliatory signal!) then it becomes`nicer' and moves into the C state, where it remains as long as the reply is a C. It moves back to the D state if the opponent chooses D. A completely hopless strategy would be EASY-GO which is represented as in Figure 4 . It is`too nice' to be a winning strategy although it starts by getting into the D state. In other words it has nothing going for it to be chosen by a rational player. A more complex strategy would be ADJUSTER which attempts to explore the opponent's play. It, for instance, sets up to choose C only once every three moves, say, unless the opponent uses D more than once in three successive moves. Then it cooperates twice in three successive moves. If the opponent cooperates whatever happens, then ADJUSTER will choose only D every time. This allows it to exploit over cooperation such as in EASY-GO.
Strategies like these and more complex ones have been tried and investigated. Recent experimental results 2, 13] point to TIT-FOR-TAT as an overall winning strategy. And because of its intrinsic reciprocity, it promotes cooperation somehow. Note that TIT-FOR-TAT, TIT-FOR-TAT] is a Nash equilibrium for the IPD.
Evolving Strategies
In 1, 2] a computational approach based on the Genetic Algorithm of Holland, 10] , has been devised which evolves strategies. This evolutionary approach relies on the representation of a strategy as a chromosome made up of all possible outcomes of the three previous moves. Because there are 4 possible outcomes for each move, i.e. R,R], T,S], S,T] and P,P], there are 4 3 or 64 possible moves. So a string of 64 genes or letters C and D makes up a strategy. But at the start of the game 6 genes are required to specify the premises of the 3 hypothetical initial moves for each player. They encode the assumed C or D choices made by each player in each of the three moves which precede the game. So for two players and three hypothetical moves 6 genes are needed.
These take the length of a strategy to 70 genes, which completely describe what a player would do in every possible situation arising in a game of IPD. It is a complete de nition of a strategy.
The Genetic Algorithm
1. Randomly generate an initial population of strategies; 2. Use each generated strategy to play a IPD against a set of known strategies such as TIT-FOR-TAT, ADJUSTER, FORG-NOT etc... 3. Select a proportion of successful strategies according to their average score over all games played so far. This score de nes the tness of each individual; 4. Use genetic operators such as cross-over and mutation to produce a new population; 5. Repeat process as necessary to be consistent with the modelling of the IPD, (see Section 2.1). This algorithm will produce more e cient strategies after each generation. It should eventually converge to one strategy which is "near optimal" given the conditions and the environment of its evolution.
Experimental results with this algorithm turned out to be surprisingly interesting and relevent to the understanding of cooperative/competitive behaviour. From a random initial population, strategies as successful as TIT-FOR-TAT were evolved. Note also that these evolved strategies are mixed strategies with a make up comprising sequences which behave like TIT-FOR-TAT. Some interesting patterns of behaviour observed are as follows.
1. outcomes R,R], R,R], S,T], followed by action D may be interpreted as if the opponent defects out of the blue then do the same, i.e. be provocable.
outcomes S,T], T,S], R,R]
, followed by action C may be interpreted as continue to cooperate after cooperation has been restored, i.e. accept apology. 3. etc... (See Appendix B for more examples from a sample output)
Implementation
We have implemented the algorithm of the previous section in Matlab. The results, although limited seem to agree with those in 2]. PRISDIL, the code for the toy programme can be seen in Appendix A and a sample output showing an evolved startegy is in Appendix B.
Conclusion
There is a large body of literature concerned with the Prisoners' Dilemma and its in nite-horizon variant, the IPD. Although the results surveyed have some ambiguity in them, it is in our view related to simulation design and the interpretation of results. But the approach, especially the computational approach is promising and the results are very interesting.
The way strategies are encoded and the use of the Genetic Algorithm capture convincingly the notion of cooperative (or otherwise) behaviour in the IPD. The approach, especially the encoding of strategies, should translate without di culty to real world applications where duopolistic or oligopolistic competition is involved, such as the Electricity Market.
From our limited experience, running experiments of this type is computationally extensive. However, they can bene t from distributed/parallel computing platforms. Such experiments are envisaged in the future. 
